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I. INTRODUCTION

An important consideration in American trials is whether information used by an expert in forming an opinion is directly admissible
into evidence as an exhibit. This issue has gained importance under
Rule 7031 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which authorizes an expert to provide a courtroom opinion based upon out-of-court data.2
The data, however, must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences about
the subject. This modernization was designed to broaden the basis
for expert opinion, and to harmonize litigation procedures with the
practices of experts when not in court.'
The courts have implemented the goal of liberal admission of expert opinions, especially those opinions based partly on the expert's
*John Byrd Martin Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A., 1956, Augustana College,
J.D., 1959, Northwestern University (Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); LL.M., 1961,
Georgetown University (E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).
The author thanks Sam Kalen for his effective research assistance, and Professor Ed Imwinkelried for thoughtfully reading the manuscript and supplying comments.
1. FED. R. EvID. 703.
2. This part of Rule 703 has been aptly characterized as its most controversial aspect. See
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENcE 703[02] at 703-9 (1982). See also E. GREEN

& C.

NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.

685 (1983).

3.
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personal knowledge and partly on third party reports." A far more
difficult issue, however, is whether an extra-record report becomes independently admissible simply because the expert referred to it as
one of the bases of his opinion. Nothing in Rule 703 specifically authorizes such a procedure, yet some courts have allowed third party
reports into evidence on such a showing.' This casual approach blurs
the distinction between the use of reports as the basis for an opinion,
and the use of reports, through independent introduction, as substantive proof. Moreover, in criminal cases the admission of such out-ofcourt data raises constitutional questions." In civil practice, the ad-mission of the underlying material may violate hearsay or other
7
rules.
This article will initially trace the evolution of the expert opinion
doctrine, depicting the expanded use of expert testimony permitted
by modern evidentiary principles. Next, this article will consider the
constitutional, hearsay, and Federal rule obstacles to free admission
of underlying expert data. This discussion will reveal that unlimited
admission of unauthenticated or unreliable expert data unduly
prejudices the trier of fact. Ultimately, this article will suggest that
admission of out-of-court expert data is allowable only when reliable
in-court testimony properly establishes the requisite foundation.
4. E.g., United States v. Head, 641 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3113
(1983); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978) (tax prosecution), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 928 (1979); Frazier v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rule 703 applied
in personal injury case); United States v. Holman, 541 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1976) (criminal case
application; material must be of a kind reasonably relied on by experts in the field); United
States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.) (psychiatrist), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975); Washington Metro. v. One Parcel of Land, 549 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1982)(expert land appraiser),
aff'd, 720 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1983) ; Hernandez v. Faker, 137 Ariz. 449, 671 P.2d 427 (Ariz. App.
1983) (statement in report of nontestifying doctor could be relied upon by doctor witness in
forming opinion); Miles v. Royal Indem. Co., 589 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (expert
repairman).
5. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
6. A defendant in a criminal case may be accused in unsworn allegations contained in a
report. Perhaps the report is relied upon by a government expert who testifies in court, and for
this reason the report is offered into evidence to "illustrate" the basis for the expert's opinion.
Such a procedure seems to clearly conflict with the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution.
7. In most noncriminal matters, sound application of hearsay restrictions suggests exclusion of such documents. The admission of records in civil litigation regularly requires live testimony by the preparer, custodian, or other qualified witness. Absent such live authentication,
the records are inadmissible. There is no specific hearsay exception for "Expert Opinion Data"
which authorizes the testifying expert to perform the authentication role. Jury instructions directing jurors to disregard the substantive effect of third party reports which are offered in this
manner will not always remove the hearsay taint.
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THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

To give opinion testimony in a specialized field, the witness must
qualify as an expert.8 Not only will the court properly exclude as expert testimony those opinions sought from an unqualified witness,
the court may also exclude opinions which have an improper basis.
When the witness relies on hearsay evidence, the court's primary concern is the expert's ability to assess the value of the out-of-court
data.
After satisfactorily establishing the witness's qualifications, trial
counsel usually moves to the merits of the case.' At this time identifi8. The witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in the field or calling,
so that his inferences and conclusions will probably aid the trier of fact. The knowledge may be
derived from reading, practice, or both. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
13 (3d ed. 1984). For discussions of the scope and style of examination needed to satisfy this
requirement, see R. CARLSON, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CIVIL TRIALS 223 (1983); E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 137 (1980); D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 730 (4th ed. 1981); T. MAuET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES

139 (1980).

9. For example, an examination of a psychiatrist may proceed as follows. The plaintiff
claims traumatic neurosis following an automobile crash. The city where the accident occurred
is the place of trial. The plaintiff was treated in this city by Doctor Wilson, a psychiatrist, as
well as by two mental health professionals in other locales. For reasons of economy, plaintiff's
counsel has decided to call only one expert to the stand, Dr. Wilson, along with lay witnesses.
Dr. Wilson has reviewed the reports of the other professionals who treated the plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel examines:

Q. (to the doctor who is basing his diagnosis in part on reports of others) "Doctor
Wilson, did you examine this patient?"
A. "Yes, last July 15 I conducted a diagnostic interview which lasted almost two
hours."
Q. "Did you form a diagnosis solely on the basis of that interview?"
A. "Not alone. I had the benefit of comprehensive reports from Walter X. Smith and
Roberta E. Lee Richardson."
Q. "Who are these people?"
A. "Doctor Smith is a psychiatrist who practices in Morena City. Dr. Richardson is a
well-known clinical psychologist in the same town. In addition to reading their written
reports, I consulted briefly with each of them by telephone. The patient was treated by
these people from a time shortly after the accident until he moved back to this city."
Q. "Referring specifically to the written reports of these specialists, do you regularly
rely on such reports in your day-to-day practice in order to make a psychiatric
diagnosis?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Are you acquainted with the custom of other psychiatrists in this regard?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Doctor, what is the practice of other psychiatrists?"
A. "Other psychiatrists regularly place some reliance on such reports in formulating
their opinions regarding a patient."
Q. "Based upon your training and experience, your own examination of the patient
as well as your review of the reports of Doctors Smith and Richardson, do you have an
opinion to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty as to diagnosis in this case?"
A. "I do."
Q. "Will you please state your opinion?"
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cation of the hearsay basis of the opinion customarily occurs. In a

jurisdiction following the Federal Rules of Evidence,10 counsel might
refer to the hearsay when phrasing hypothetical questions. The attention of the witness will be drawn to facts already in the record
through the device of assumptions contained in the hypothetical
question. In the case of a testifying physician, for example, the expert

witness will testify that based upon the stated assumptions and after
review of the initial treating physician's report, he entertains an
opinion as to diagnosis.11 Testimony will be needed to establish that
is customary medical practice.
reliance on the other doctor's report
12
opinion.
his
states
then
The expert
During the examination, the trial lawyer will not direct the expert
to read to the jury the hearsay reports which furnished the basis for
his opinion. Nor will the witness be asked to summarize for the trier
the findings of the other experts by reviewing the conclusions contained in their writings. Rather, the course of courtroom examination
simply clarifies the underpinnings of the expert's knowledge, a far cry

from informing the jury of all or part of the documents prepared by
outside experts."
A. "The plaintiff was, and is, suffering from traumatic neurosis triggered by the
emotional impact of the auto crash."
For other examples, see R. CARLSON, 3 CRImINAL LAW ADVOCAcy. TRA PROOF 6-85 (1983).
The key testimony regarding customary reliance may be requested in an alternate fashion.
McElhaney suggests this form of question to a physician: "Can you tell us, Doctor Willis,
whether it is customary and reasonable for experts in the field of neurology to rely on such
information [lab reports and reports of other specified doctors] in making professional judgments?" J. MCELHANEY, EXPERT WrTNEssEs AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENcE 463, 484
(1977).
10.

Many states do. For a listing, see R. CARLSON, E. Imwaauxn & E. KIoNKA, MATas-

(1983).
11. At common law, all of the facts had to be in evidence. In contrast, Rule 703 allows
opinions based on inadmissible data.
12. See FED. R. EVIrD. 705. The use of hypotheticals in capital cases was confirmed in
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983). In the view of the Supreme Court, psychiatric testimony was properly given in response to hypothetical questions concerning the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness. Id.
13. Hearsay and confrontation concerns would seem minimal where the expert simply
identifies a third party report as a basis for his opinion. In addition, a description by the witness of the general subjects discussed in the report may be unobjectionable.
Finally, in particular situations reference by the expert to relevant studies completed by
other experts in different cases may not be inappropriate, where the studies provide some insight in the litigated situation. Consider, for example, toxicologist testimony regarding conflicting schools of thought as to when a person is intoxicated. Expert testimony may be elicited that
while at .10 blood alcohol content most people are considered drunk, other studies are in disagreement and say that the acceptable level should be .15. See R. ERwiN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK
DRING CASES § 23.06 at 23-125 & § 36.07 at 36-21 (1983).
The danger of error seems most critical when third party information is developed for the
very case on trial. For example, when the government's expert reads third party opinions concerning the litigated case to the jury, hearsay and confrontation policies are encroached upon.
ALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERiALs 8
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III. MODERNIZATION OF THE OPINION RULE

A. The Federal Approach
To a great extent, Rule 703 represents a response to prior formu-

lations which unduly limited the use of expert opinions. In numerous
cases, expert opinions based upon out-of-court documents, reports, or
findings of other experts in the field were excluded. Unless the origi-

nal records were authenticated by an appropriate witness, 14 a medical
expert's testimony would have been excluded if his courtroom opinion was based, in part, on non-record laboratory reports or conversations with other doctors. 1 5 Subject to limited exceptions, Rule 703
sweeps away these old restrictions and allows an in-court expert to
state opinions based on non-record information.'"
This also occurs when an outside expert develops findings and conclusions applicable to the
parties before the court, places them in a report which is received in evidence as an exhibit, and
does not appear to defend his conclusions or to be cross-examined.
14. Traditionally, in order to introduce business records, the custodian from the business
which prepared the records had to be called. Later formulations recognized a discretionary
power in the trial judge to either enforce the traditional requirement or, in his discretion, to
permit the offered record to be verified by a supervising officer from such business. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, at 882. In practice, most of the time business entries will be sponsored by
the records custodian or librarian from the business that generated the records. See NLRB v.
First Termite Control Co., 646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981); Elizarras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d
366, 374 n.24 (1980). See also E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, at 171. However, a few recent
cases have taken the approach of not requiring that the records be prepared by the business
which has custody of them. See Mississippi River Grain Elev. v. Bartlett, 659 F.2d 1314 (5th
Cir. 1981).
15. For example, the problem could arise if the patient of a Florida doctor was originally
injured in Florida but received a portion of his treatment in New York. Suppose that in addition to his own examination of the patient, the Florida physician studied the records of the
New York hospital and doctors in order to carefully and correctly treat the patient's condition.
When the same Florida doctor testified in court, conceding that he partly relied on the out-ofstate records could be fatal to his testimony. Only when the original records were authenticated
by the custodian or other appropriate witness, often with the expenditure of substantial time
and funds, could the Florida doctor honestly admit he relied on them in arriving at his clinical
judgment.
16. The advisory committee note to Rule 703 observes that physicians make life-anddeath decisions in reliance upon reports and opinions from nurses, x-ray technicians, and other
doctors. The testifying physician's courtroom testimony based on such material, "expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes." FED. R. Evm.
704, advisory committee note.
Of course, some rules and decisions continue to follow a more limited approach. See, e.g.,
Brackin v. State, 417 So. 2d 602 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982). See also MICH. R. EviD. 703; Grewe v.
Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich. 240, 273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1979) (x-ray report not
admitted into evidence; however, under new rules court would have discretion as to whether to
require the medical record to be in evidence). But see infra note 22. Imwinkelreid observes:
There is a split of authority whether the expert may rely on reports from third parties
such as other experts if the reports do not fall within any hearsay exception. The traditional view has been that the expert may not do so. However, the Federal Rules follow
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B. Court Interpretationof the Rule
Although Rule 703 took effect in 1975, some courts had already
applied the rule's policy. 17 Notable early examples existed in the areas of psychiatric"8 and land valuation experts. 19 With medical witnesses, reliance on hearsay was often permissible as many of the
records consulted by a doctor qualified under a hearsay exception.2 0
With the expansion of hearsay exceptions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, difficulties were further reduced. The more liberal avenues
for admission of relevant evidence facilitated introduction of much of
the underlying data.2 1
There are, however, numerous situations where trial counsel may
decide to forego placing some or all of the underlying data into evidence. Reasons of economy may militate against substantial expenditures for producing authenticating witnesses to a marginally important document. In other cases, the lawyer may have failed to plan
ahead and, because of time constraints, have gone to trial with a single expert witness. In certain instances the decision to forego introduction of underlying data as substantive proof may be strategic. For
tactical reasons the proponent of expert testimony may determine
that he does not want an underlying document admitted because a
few of the document's entries are damaging. The lawyer settles for a
general reference to the document as one of the bases for the expert's
opinion. Finally, the lawyer may forego any attempt to secure introduction of the nonrecord data simply because he views the data as
plainly inadmissible.
None of the circumstances described above bar an expert from
giving an opinion based on unproduced data. Provided the expert
reasonably relied on the unproduced data and his specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact, the opinion is admissible. Numerous
holdings have firmly established the principle that, when underlying
the trend in the case law that the expert may do so as long as it is the customary practice
in the specialty to consider that type of data.
E. IMWINMLRED, supra note 8, at 139 (1980).

17. Note, HearsayBases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of FederalRule
of Evidence 703, 51 So. CAL. L. REv. 129, 130 (1977).
18. Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also BirdseU v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
19. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WFaNsTEm's EvwENcE 703[02] at 703-12 (1982).
20. Id. at 703-11.
21. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(4) on history statements by patients to doctors. In J.
WINsTEmN, J. MANSFmLD, N. AnR.ims & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDNsCE 403
(1983) [hereinafter cited as J. WmsTmN], the question of an expert opinion based upon a
patient's statements is discussed. Under one approach, the statements are not employed for
their independent value, but as the basis for opinion. Under the federal pattern, they are independently admissible through a hearsay exception.
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facts are of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts, the opinion of the testifying expert will be admitted.2 2
The modern rule of reasonable and customary reliance2 3 allows
the trial judge to test the appropriateness of the expert's reliance on
out-of-court data.2 4 Initially, the trial court decides whether an ex22. See United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1982); Mannino v. Intern. Mfg.
Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1981); Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); Gregory
v. South Hills Movers, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1979); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 397 (1978). Both civil and criminal cases have followed the rule. See also
supra note 4. But see Brackin v. State, 417 So. 2d 602 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982). The Brackin case
rules that witnesses, including medical experts, cannot testify to facts their knowledge of which
is derived from unsworn statements of others. The court concluded:
There is a trend toward the admission of an expert's opinion based partly on medical,
psychological, or hospital reports not in evidence if the reports are of a type in the practice of his profession. Annot. 55 A.L.R.3d 551 (1974). However, this trend has not been
followed by the courts of this state.
Id. at 606.
In Pattendon, Expert Opinion Evidence Based on Hearsay, 1982 CRIM. L. REv. 85, 96, this
view is arrived at after a review of commonwealth authorities:
If the hearsay basis of an opinion
the trial and no exception to the
ignored unless the hearsay played
based on hearsay can be severed

is not supported by admissible evidence at the end of
hearsay rule can be relied upon, the opinion must be
no real role in the formation of the opinion or the part
from the part based on first-hand knowledge.

Id.
In Michigan, the advisory committee's note, MICH. R. EviD. 703, observes that "MRE 703
is inconsistent with Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. . . ." Interpretations have been
more liberal. See, e.g., Tiffany v. Christman Co., 93 Mich. App. 267, 287 N.W.2d 199 (1980) (no
per se rule barring experts from relying on nonrecord evidence). In United States Aviex Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983), the court held: "MRE 703
clearly provides that the trial court may permit expert testimony based on facts or data not in
evidence." Id. at 542, 336 N.W.2d at 844.
23. Sometimes termed the customary reliance test. See supra note 17, at 140.
24. United States v. Cox, 696 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir.) (unreasonable reliance), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 99 (1983); Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Equip., Inc. 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1982)
(inadequate proof of reliance); Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721 (6th Cir.
1981) (opinion of state trooper not admissible where based primarily on stories of biased eye
witnesses); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (reliance on outside reports
justified), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1017 (1982); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th
Cir. 1971) (property valuation based on unauthenticated documents), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954
(1972); Wilder Enter. v. Allied Artists Pictures, 632 F.2d 1135 (1980) (economist's testimony
excluded); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978) (no abuse of discretion), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 540 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (economist); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897 (D.
Colo. 1981), aff'd, Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983) (reliance on hearsay
which other experts would not rely on rendered opinion improper); Sikes v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 429 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.) (accidentologist), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 353
(1983); Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1983) (opinion proper because it did not rely on
out-of-court statements); Moore it. Grantham, 599 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1980) (expert opinion may
not be based solely on statements of third persons, unless statements are properly in evidence;
where expert's opinion based solely on hearsay, error to allow opinion); Smith v. Tennessee Life
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pert opinion based on non-record facts or data is admissible.2 5 When

the decision is a difficult one, the trial judge will examine the expert
outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the conditions
of reasonable and expert reliance are met.26 The controversy may become complex. In deciding whether the data is reasonably relied
upon by similar experts, the judge might want to hear from experts
other than the in-court witness. If the judge decides that the data is
not reasonably relied upon, he may bar the expert's opinion altogether, bar it to the extent it relies on impermissible data, or only bar
references to the impermissible data.27
Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (expert witness may not rely on just any hearsay). In supra note 17, at 132, it is suggested that the expert's hearsay bases may be unreliable
for two reasons. "First, the methodology used to collect and analyze the information provided
to the testifying psychiatrist may be unreliable. Second, the expert's own biases in collecting
and interpreting that data may render it unreliable." For these reasons, the Note urges a
searching inquiry by the trial court.
In courts which allow the expert to give his opinion based on hearsay, some cases allow the
underlying data to come before the jury. See, e.g., Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d
1349 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
96 (1982); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1981); Swanek v. Hutzel
Hosp., 115 Mich. App. 254, 320 N.W.2d 234 (1982). Two of these cases, Madrid and Falzone,
have been cited in at least one study as illustrative of decisions which conclude that otherwise
inadmissible hearsay data may come into evidence. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, SEvENTH ANNUAL FAu MEETING 66 (1982). In Falzone, however, the major question on
appeal seems to be the oft-encountered one of whether opinion testimony based in part on
information from others is admissible under federal rules. The appellant moved to strike the
opinion of the state fire marshal, and the court in this per curiam opinion relied on customary
reasoning that experts may base courtroom opinions on reports from third parties. Expansive
discussion of the appropriateness of using the expert as a conduit for the opinions of others
does not appear. 644 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1981).
Madrid presents a different situation. Third party reports are not involved. Rather, a government expert based his diagnosis on the defendant's admissions. During a mental examination to see if the defendant was competent to stand trial, Madrid told a psychiatrist that he
had committed prior offenses. Defendant's admissions in this regard were used by the psychiatrist in forming his opinion that defendant was mentally responsible. Consistent with prior law,
when the defendant raised the issue of insanity the expert could use Madrid's statements. 673
F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982). Compare the situation when the expert seeks to testify to statements
of third parties. Commonwealth v. Kendall, 9 Mass. Appl. 152, 339 N.E.2d 1115 (1980) (reversible error). In the latter situation, the residual exception to the hearsay rule may not save the
evidence. The advisory committee note, Fem. R. EvD. 803(24) makes no specific reference to
these expert witness situations.
25. See supra note 17, at 142.
26. J. WFsTINS & M. BERGER, supranote 2, at 703-26. In litigation over the reasonableness of an expert's reliance on the underlying data, one court found that a hearsay statement
was not the type of statement upon which an expert economist should reasonably rely. American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 540 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See Pratt, A Judicial
Perspectiveon Opinion Evidence Under the FederalRules, 39 WAsH. & LEE L. Ry. 313, 319
(1982); collecting cases, see S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EvIDENcE MANUAL
150 (3d ed. 1984). As a general rule, the question of reasonableness of reliance is for the judge.
The trial court must find that an expert would act upon such data in his work, for purposes
other than testifying in a court of law. See, e.g., State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (Me. 1978).
27. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EvIDENCE 863 (1983) [hereinaf-
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THE CASE AGAINST FORMAL ADMISSION OF UNAUTHENTICATED
UNDERLYING DATA

A. The Gathering Controversy
While many states modernized expert witness practice by statute
or rule, others did so judicially. For example, in State v. Davis2s the

Iowa Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, embraced Rule 703 as controlling for state trials. 29 In Davis, a doctor based his opinion on laboratory tests conducted by others not under his supervision. The test
results were disclosed in hospital reports which formed much of the
foundation for the doctor's courtroom testimony. After ruling that
the doctor's courtroom opinion was admissible, the court found no
reversible error in admitting the underlying hospital test records as
well. 0 The Davis court apparently felt that Rule 703 mandates admission of relied upon hearsay evidence regardless of whether the evidence meets a standard hearsay exception. This interpretation,
therefore, would arguably permit admission of third party reports
without the author's in-court appearance, as well as admission of hospital and business records without in-court authentication of the documents by their custodian.3 1
The Davis decision came at a time when authorities were speculating about the dimensions of Rule 703. 3 2 One commentator suggested that where experts rely on hearsay, trial courts may allow the
hearsay material into evidence when offered by the proponent of the
witness.33 Others malntained that the court's discretion should be ex3
ercised to exclude "full" introduction of the foundation documents. 4
ter cited as R. LEMPERT].
28. 269 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1978).
29. Later, Federal Rule 703 was adopted by the legislature when a comprehensive evidence code patterned after the federal rules was enacted, effective July 1, 1983. On prior Iowa
law, the Davis opinion cites several precedents. Any potential contrary indications which may
have been read into cases like Holnquist v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa
App. 1977) were apparently overruled, at least sub silentio. Cf. State v. Judkins, 242 N.W.2d
266 (Iowa 1976) (trial court erred in admitting indirect hearsay testimony of state's handwriting
expert).
30. Davis, 269 N.W.2d at 4410-41.
31. There are reasons for the appearance of the custodian, or other authenticating witness. The adversary may wish to test, through cross-examination, the record practices of the
institution or business. Federal courts have emphasized that business records must be properly
kept in order to be admissible. The decision in United States v. Williams, 661 F.2d 528 (5th
Cir. 1981) points out the need to prove the reliability and trustworthiness of the records. Defendant's conviction was reversed because of a failure to observe these standards.
32. See infra text accompanying note 36.
33. See Hall, Chairman's Corner, 8 LrrM. NEws Winter 1983, at 2. See also C. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, at 910.
34. E.g., Carlson, supra note 8, at 219. See P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDER8TANDING THE NEw-FED-
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Rule 703 allows the expert to give a courtroom opinion based on
facts or data which may be, although need not be, admissible evidence. The broad language of Rule 703 has, however, created uncertainty concerning the admissiblity of material relied upon by the expert.35 The uncertainty focuses on whether the evidence is received as
substantive proof, as a new exception to the hearsay rule, or whether
the material may be mentioned only for the limited purpose of demonstrating what data the expert relied upon. 8 This controversy has
continued to plague the courts.
B. Constitutional Constraints
In criminal cases, introduction of the underlying report as a separate exhibit may violate the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. A primary interest secured by the clause is the right of crossexamination.3 7 In Douglas v. Alabama,3 8 an alleged accomplice of the
accused was called as a state's witness in an assault trial. On direct
examination he refused to answer any questions concerning the
crime. The judge consequently granted the prosecution's motion to
declare the witness hostile. Under the guise of cross-examination the
prosecutor produced the witness' confession and read it in the jury's
presence. During his presentation of the confession, the prosecutor
paused after every few sentences to ask the witness "Did you make
that statement?""9
The alleged confession implicated Douglas in the crime. When examined by defense counsel, the witness once again refused to talk.
The Supreme Court found that these events violated the defendant's
rights under the sixth amendment because the defendant was unable
to cross-examine the witness regarding the allegations contained in
RULES OF EVIDENCE 84 (1973); Waltz, Evidence is Dead, Wigmore Obsolescent; Long Live
JudicialDiscretion, 76 Nw. RPmR. 12 (1983), discussing O'Gee v. Dobbs House, Inc., 570 F.2d
1084 (2d Cir. 1978). Professor Waltz points to an American Bar Association study which asserts
that "the use of Rule 703 to place before the jury otherwise inadmissible hearsay raises a serious potential for abuse." J. WALTz, PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 210
(1983).
IDAL

35. The court pulled back from an expansive interpretation of this aspect of Davis in
State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979) (use of such hearsay does not render the testifying witness' opinion inadmissible, but that does not mean hearsay itself is admissible).
36. 78 FED. R. EvD. NEWS 118 (1978) (citing State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (Me. 1978)). At
another point, Federal Rules of Evidence News refers to the "unsettled question of whether
Rule 703 constitutes a giant exception to the hearsay rule as to otherwise inadmissible hearsay
reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion." 83 FED. R. EvD. NEWS 78. Unfortunately, some of the few court decisions which have expanded Rule 703 to achieve this result
have done so with a less than complete analysis of the involved issues.
37. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
38. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

39. Id. at 416.
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the out-of-court confession. The Court held the inability to cross-exdefendant of the essential right secured by the
amine deprived the 40
ocnfrontation clause.

For a defendant to be accused based on unsworn allegations contained in the report of a person not subject to cross-examination
seems clearly prohibited by the Constitution.4 ' Introduction of a copy
of the document as an exhibit or the recitation of some of its contents presents profound hearsay and confrontation issues. 42 Moreover, a witness' testimony reporting the conclusions of third parties
raises special constitutional difficulties. For example, where a criminal defendant asserts the insanity defense, a psychiatrist called by
the prosecution may testify that the defendant is competent. The
state's psychiatrist may also reveal to the jury that her opinion of
sanity is based partly on a similar conclusion recorded by a nontestifying psychiatrist. 43 While the judge would instruct the jury to disre40. Id. at 420. "Hence, effective confrontation of Loyd was possible only if Loyd affirmed
the statement as his. However, Loyd did not do so, but relied on his privilege to refuse to
answer." Id.
41. E.g., United States v. Pinto, 486 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1980). There are positive rule
proscriptions against introduction of evaluative government reports. See FED. R. Evm.
803(8)(C). In United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977) defendant claimed that the
trial court erred by admitting into evidence two exhibits purporting to be the official report and
accompanying worksheet of the Customs Service chemist who analyzed the powder seized from
Oates' companion. Id. at 63. The government had planned to call Milton Weinberg, a retired
Customs Service chemist, who had allegedly analyzed the powder. But by the time Weinberg
was scheduled to testify he apparently became unavailable due to illness. The government then
called another Customs Service chemist, Shirley Harrington, who was able to testify concerning
the regular practices and procedures used by Customs' chemists in analyzing unknown substances. The documentary evidence was admitted through her. Id. at 64. The defense objected,
not only because of its inability to cross examine Weinberg, but because of certain irregularities
in the documents themselves. Id. at 65.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that a chemist's
report and worksheet are inadmissible hearsay because they are specifically excluded by Rules
803(8)(B) and (C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 66-68. The government urged that
reports not admissible under Rule 803(8) could be received as records of regularly conducted
activity under Rule 803(6). Id. at 72-74. The Court of Appeals held that police and evaluative
reports not satisfying the standards of 803(8) do not qualify under 803(6) or any other exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
42. The potential magnitude of such hearsay material is far greater than the minimally
significant out-of-court declarations addressed in some Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (indicia of reliability found as to single statement made by out-ofcourt declarant). On the requirement of an original when a writing is offered into evidence, see
FED. R. EVID. 1002.
43. After identifying the reliance of the expert witness on the third party report, the prosecutor asks the government psychiatrist:
Q. (to the testifying government psychiatrist) "Did you completely review the report
of Dr. Frank?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "What was his diagnosis?"
A. "Doctor Frank identified a mild neurosis, nothing spectacular."
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gard the substantive effect of the nontestifying psychiatrist's report,
the evidence will nevertheless come in "simply to illustrate the basis
of the expert's opinion." The weakness of this rationalization for
courtroom reference to third party reports and conclusions, however,
is clear.44 The indirect introduction of these reports impinges on the
defendant's sixth amendment rights.
C. Rule Restrictions
Rule 703 applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings. While it
may be argued that limitations on free admissibility of underlying
data are greater in criminal cases, 45 a hearsay objection is a potent
weapon in either proceeding. Because of the relative preciseness of
many hearsay exceptions, some reviewing courts may accord trial
judges little discretion in determining admissibility of hearsay
evidence.4 6
Q. "Did he make a conclusion regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of
the acts involved in this case?"
A. "He certainly did."
Q. "Will you please tell us what he stated?"
A. "Dr. Frank found the defendant aware, competent, and of a comprehending mind
at the time of the crime. The doctor had performed a whole battery of tests on the
defendant."
44. On the inability of jury instructions to deal effectively with the situation, see Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Bruton, involving the problem of a codefendant's confession, held that encroachment on the right to confrontation could not be avoided by an instruction to the jury to disregard hearsay accusations against the accused. The jury cannot segregate
evidence into separate intellectual boxes.
In related fashion, civil litigants may argue that an out-of-court report should be admitted
as an adjunct of the direct examination "simply to illustrate the basis for the expert's opinion,
not as substantive evidence." The distinction will likely escape the jury, and the subterfuge
should not be allowed to frustrate accepted hearsay policies. As in certain other areas of evidence law, it would be mythical to expect the jury simply to consider its illustrative effect and
disregard its substantive content. On the difficulty with such instructions, see Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility:Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CoRNEsL L.Q 239, 249 (1967).
Respected authorities have urged that cautionary instructions may be helpful in expert
witness situations to turn the jury away from the substantive force of underlying data, except
where hearsay permeates the situation. In many of the difficult circumstances posed in this
article, such is exactly the case.
45. But see United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971) (not accurate
to say that more stringent hearsay rule must be applied in criminal than civil cases), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
46. Kaplan, Mason Ladd and Interesting Cases, 66 IowA L. Ray. 931 (1981). Kaplan observed that predictability has been advanced as one of the virtues of a relatively precise set of
hearsay doctrines. The hearsay rule generally has "taken the form of a rigid rule allowing little
discretion for the trial judge to admit evidence not within relatively precise exceptions ....
It
is argued that vesting discretionary power in the trial judge to admit hearsay would destroy the
predictability of litigation and make the settlement of cases more difficult." Id. at 934-35.
Kaplan recommends the motion in limine to resolve close questions and to assist predictability.
On the form of the motion, see R. CARLSON, SUCCESSFUL TEcHNIQUHS FOR CwVm TRALs 6 (1983).
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There is no precise exception in the hearsay provisions for "Expert Opinion Data."4 In order for background hearsay material to be
admissible, it must first be authenticated properly. For example, business records are a frequent source of support for expert opinion and
their admission requires foundational testimony by the preparer or
custodian of the record or other qualified witness. When the testifying expert witness did not actually prepare the reports his opinion is
based upon, he is rarely the needed foundation witness. Without the
prescribed authentication, the testifying expert may refer only generally to the existence and use of out-of-court data contained in an extrinsic document. 48 Hearsay principles bar the witness from reading
major portions of the contents or conclusions contained therein to
49
the jury.
Notwithstanding the absence of a special hearsay exception for
expert background data, advocates of free admissibility may argue
for admission based upon comity and notions of equal treatment.
Since a cross-examiner is permitted to scrutinize, and even impeach
with the background hearsay material, 0 why not allow opposing
counsel an opportunity to diffuse this tactic on direct examination?
Criminal cases, see R. CARLSON, supra note 9, at App. 11lA (1983).
47. In contrast, for example, see the specific exemption from hearsay exclusion carved out
for reliable learned treatises. FED.R. EVID. 803(18). Even here, the statements may only be read
to the jury. The article or document will not be received as an exhibit. See Maggipinto v.
Reichman, 481 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Doctors are allowed to testify as to statements made to them by their patients. See FEn. R.
EVID. 803(4).

48. See supra note 13.
49. Jury instructions alone will not cure the problem. See supra note 44. Just as there is
no precise dispensation from the hearsay bar for underlying expert opinion data, neither is
there such a dispensation from best evidence objections. In contrast, see the specific exemption
of public records from the original writings rule. FED R. EvID. 1005. The underlying data may
be objectionable for other reasons as well, such as violation of the opinion rule.
50. Disclosure of underlying data may be required on cross-examination. FED. R. EvM.
705. "To enable the trier of fact to weigh the expert's opinion once it is admitted, the federal
rules require an expert to disclose the particular fact basis of his opinion on request." See
supra note 17, at 142. The outside report may be used to impeach the expert who relied on it.
See State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982). See also M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE 338
(1983). On whether the expert may be cross-examined from a hearsay report, the element of
reliance has been deemed as important in a number of cases. See Bryan v. John Bean Div. of
FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978); Ferguson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 132 Ariz. 47, 643
P.2d 1017 (Ariz. App. 1981); Wilson v. Leonard Tire Co., 90 N.M. 74, 559 P.2d 1201 (N.M. App.
1977); Cadel v. Sherburne Corp., 139 Vt. 134, 425 A.2d 546 (1980). Where such reliance is
shown and the witness is properly cross-examined, the reference to the report is for impeachment purposes, not substantive evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th
Cir. 1971). The Wilson case goes further and holds that even if the physicians had relied on
hearsay in forming opinions "that. would not make the hearsay itself admissible." 559 P.2d at
1203.
For methods of cross-examination of an expert who relied on hearsay reports to formulate
his opinion, see E. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATrACKINC SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 379 (1982).
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The argument raises the issue of whether sensible rules of evidence
can deny a direct examiner that which they freely allow a cross-examiner. The answer is an unqualified yes.
An examination of Federal Rule 612 illustrates the disparate
treatment of the roles played by opposing counsel during trial. After
a witness successfully refreshes his memory from a writing while testifying, many direct examiners would love to prevail on a motion to
admit the writing into evidence. The prohibitions against admission,
however, are clear. Common law proscriptions barred formal introduction of refreshing instruments. Evidence law codifications maintain the bar, 1 and every introduction right spelled
out in Rule 612
52
cross-examiners.
of
benefit
the
to
only
inures
D. Case Law Applications
When a report upon which an in-court expert relies was prepared
by others, a host of reasons militate against free, unauthenticated introduction. Confrontation problems surfaced in State v. Towne5"
when the state called an expert witness in forensic psychiatry to determine whether the defendant was competent. The expert testified
that the defendant was sexually disturbed, but not mentally ill. In
developing his testimony, the forensic psychiatrist relied on information from a book written by a nontestifying doctor. The witness also
consulted with the author and informed the jury: "I would say
that
'54
Doctor Rada is in concurrence with my opinion in this case.
The Vermont Supreme Court initially recognized that the expert's
testimony concerning the nontestifying doctor's opinion fell outside
any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecution's justification that the outside evidence was offered simply to buttress and
support the courtroom expert's testimony was not persuasive. 5
Bypassing extended discussion regarding the data an expert could
rely upon, the court narrowed its focus to determine what type of
data the expert could place in evidence.5 The court found that the
51. FED. R. EVm. 801(c). While prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible,
there are exceptions. See FED. R. Evw. 801(d)(1)(B), 803(5).
52. After a cross-examiner reviews the refreshing document, he is allowed to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
testimony of the witness. Fau. R. Evm. 612.
53. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982).
54. Id. at 244, 453 A.2d at 1134.
55. In similar fashion, sometimes advocates of admissibility for underlying expert data
urge introduction in order to "illustrate the basis for the expert's opinion, not as substantive
evidence." See Hall, supra note 33, at 2. The refined distinction will likely escape the jury. It
would seem that the confrontation clause could not be frustrated by such indirection. See the
analysis contained in supra note 44.
56. 142 Vt. at 246, 453 A.2d at 1135.
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testifying expert gave his own opinion, and then acted as a conduit
for the other doctor's opinion. The court concluded that one expert
may not introduce the opinion of a nontestifying expert without running afoul of the hearsay rule."'
Turning to a constitutional analysis, the court determined the
witness' incorporation of the other doctor's opinion violated the confrontation clause because the defense was prevented from cross-examining the out-of-court declarant. In few areas is a denial of confrontation more damaging than in the field of mental diagnoses,
where disagreement exists even among trained experts. Consequently, the court held that a criminal defendant has the right to
explore the basis and content of the expert's opinion as well as the
professional qualifications of the person rendering it."
State v. Towne exemplifies the deleterious impact that recitation
of relied upon out-of-court statements or opinions may have upon
the judicial process. After the evidence in the case was closed, the
state's attorney urged the jury to convict the defendant because "the
man who wrote the book" on sexual disorders agreed that the defendant was sane.59 The invocation of a "second opinion" through a single witness is but one way the recitation of out-of-court data may
influence the trier of fact. Whether accomplished during the evidentiary phase or later, heavy reference to such data frequently strengthens the expert witness' opinion in the minds of the jury. For such
support to come from a nontestifying expert insulated from crossexamination presents a difficult, almost impossible situation for the
opponent of the evidence."
57. Id. The ramifications of such reasoning for "summarizing" expert witnesses seems
clear. In United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981) the court held that the government could not simply produce a witness who did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements made by others. On summary witnesses generally, see United States v. Williams, 447
F.2d 1285, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972); J. WEINSTmN, supra note 21,
at 401.
58. Towne, 142 Vt. at 247-48, 453 at 1136.
59. On argument and confrontation generally, see Carlson, Argument to the Jury and the
ConstitutionalRight of Confrontation, 9 CPiM. L. BULL. 293 (1973).
60. The problem is especially serious when the lack of confrontation involves opinions
and factual determinations affecting the litigated case, as opposed to general scientific statements. There can be minimal denials of confrontation, but such is not the case where third
party reports or opinions are offered on critical aspects of claims or defenses.
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed Edwin Towne's conviction and ordered a new trial.
As it did so, it suggested that underlying expert data may be used to cross-examine an expert
who relies on it. Cross-examination and impeachment with out-of-court data are points discussed elsewhere in this article. See supra note 50. Other decisions cut in the direction of excluding underlying data. E.g., Long v. State, 649 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1983); United States v.
Swaim, 642 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.
1971); Estate of Buchanan, 78 Cal. App. 2d 281, 144 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1978); Everett v. State, 97
So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1957); Coulter v. Stewart, 97 N.M. 616, 642 P.2d 601 (1982); O'Kelly v. State,
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California decisions have addressed related issues in mental
health cases. These decisions sometimes involve confinement of a
person following a jury finding that the person is "gravely disabled."
94 N.M. 74, 607 P.2d 612 (1980); Long v. State, 649 S.W.2d 363 ('rex. App. 1983). Reversing
because a prosecution expert witness was permitted to testify to inadmissible prejudicial hearsay, see Commonwealth v. Kendall, 9 Mass. App. 152, 399 N.E.2d 1115 (1980) (an expert may
not, under the guise of stating the reasons for his opinion, testify to matters in the course of
direct examination unless such matters are admissible under recognized exception to hearsay
rule). There are, of course, numerous decisions which uphold opinions based on nonrecord matter, over hearsay objections. In a criminal case, when a government witness has personal knowledge and also reviews nonrecord material to provide an opinion, principles of fair disclosure
dictate that the material be made available to the defense. The defendant should have access to
the supporting data, and adequate opportunity to prepare for cross-examination. The case of
United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981), appears to hold something for both
sides. The Lawson court decided that an expert's testimony based entirely on hearsay would
violate defendant's constitutional right to confrontation; however, where an expert reasonably
relies in part on reports of others, and the accused has access to the hearsay information relied
on, the testimony is proper. On introduction of the opinion, see United States v. Head, 641 F.2d
174 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971).
Under federal law, the prosecutor may ask an expert on the stand to state the basis for his
opinion, and the expert may cite as one source an out-of-court report. All this is proper. For the
prosecutor then to proceed to simply offer (and for the court to receive) the out-of-court report
as an exhibit does violence to the defendant's confrontation rights.
The dangers become real when viewed in the context of an illustrative criminal case. Many
assault statutes provide for enhanced punishment when the assault results in "serious bodily
injury." Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4th 1312 (1983). With such crimes, the government must establish
that the victim suffered bodily injury as an element of the offense. Suppose Walter Victim is
treated on an emergency basis by Doctor Hiram Quick at the scene of a tavern brawl. The
doctor prepares a report. The county medical examiner (not Dr. Quick) provides medical testimony at the trial that Walter Victim was seriously injured: bruises, lacerations, and a concussion. His findings are based, in important part, on the written report of Dr. Quick. Does Dr.
Quick's report become automatically admissible as a prosecution exhibit simply because it was
relied upon by the medical examiner? Have reliability standards been satisfied, solely because
the report was referred to by a medical witness? Courts addressing these questions in future
cases should answer with an emphatic "no."
Evidentiary rejection of out-of-court data as an affirmative exhibit is not without its
problems, of course. One of these is noted in J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 21, as this text compares
the difficulties of disclosure with the advantage of doing so. "If the trier is told of the hearsay
statement, a possibility exists that he will use it in an objectionable fashion. At the same time,
revelation of the basis of expert opinion is arguably a rational way of enabling the trier to
determine the value of that opinion." Id. at 399-400.
Some authorities point out that the revelation of foundation items prior to the rendering of
an expert opinion helps to clarify the expert's opinion for the trier of facts, when one of the
bases for the opinion is hearsay, such as a third party report, needed disclosure would seem
satisfied by identifying the report as a source, and perhaps providing a general description of
the subjects treated therein. "Obviously, testimony reporting the observations of others would
be hearsay." R. LEMPERT, supra note 27, at 865. Generally, the expert need not go this far to
comply with rules mandating direct disclosure of material upon which the opinion is based;
neither does the expert have to read the findings and conclusions from the third party report.
See supra note 13. Under the Federal Rules, elaborate disclosure of the basis for an opinion on
direct examination is not required. Rather, the onus of eliciting the basis is placed on the crossexaminer. See, e.g., Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978). "This
approach is clearly sensible in civil cases in jurisdictions where rules of procedure .. . allow
substantial pretrial discovery." R. LEMPERT, supra note 27, at 867.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss2/5

16

Carlson: Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXXVI

Courts sometime admit third party records as demonstrative of the
basis for the testifying expert's opinion. 6' In such cases, however, admissibility does not extend to the independent diagnoses of the outof-court psychiatrists. 2 Because a mental health diagnosis is rooted
in the physician's thought process, the diagnosing physician is required to testify in court."' In one case involving admission of records
which contained independent diagnoses of out-of-court experts, the
court stated that the submission of the entire medical record to the
jury, compounded by the refusal to give a limiting instruction, constituted an abuse of discretion and was error.'
When the trial judge allows an expert witness to quote extensively
from an out-of-court report prepared by a nontestifying expert, the
prejudicial error analysis of Towne appears appropriate. This analysis may not apply, however, where the nontestifying expert was supervised by the witness. 5 Occasionally the practice of exposing the
trier of fact to supportive factual material, later held inadmissible, is
deemed nonprejudicial because it is not intelligible to laymen. 6
61. Estate of Buchanan, 78 Cal. App. 3d 281, 144 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1978).
62. Id. at 288, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 244. Where factual data is admissible, such as hospital
staff observations as opposed to diagnoses by out-of-court psychiatrists, a limiting instruction
regarding the effect of the data is appropriate.
63. Id. at 287, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
64. Id. at 288, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 245. However, the admission of the hearsay portion of the
records was deemed harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Prior
California law ruled that the report of a doctor to whom a patient is referred by a medical
witness and which is used by such witness as part of the history of the case is admissible even
though the doctor who made the report is not called to the stand. Such history information is
not admissible as independent proof of the facts but as part of the information upon which the
physician witness based his diagnosis. Springer v. Reimers, 4 Cal. App. 325, 84 Cal. Rptr. 486
(1970). Where it is clear that the out-of-court doctors' opinion on a crucial issue in a case is
received as independent proof of the facts, a hearsay error results. Whitfield v. Roth, 10 Cal. 3d
874, 519 P.2d 588, 112 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1974). The California Supreme Court pointed out that in
the latter situation, the opportunity of cross-examining the other doctors as to the basis of their
opinions is denied the party as to whom the testimony is adverse. Id. at 894, 519 P.2d at 603,
112 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
65. E.g., State v. Salter, 162 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa 1968) (testifying pathologist supervised
laboratory tests reported by others).
66. E.g., State v. Rupp, 120 Ariz. 490, 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. App. 1978).
Land condemnation proceedings have long represented another exception to the general
rule, where proof of comparable sales through expert testimony is often the practice. This may
be the case in several courts which routinely reject hearsay in other cases even as the partial
basis for an expert's opinions. See Empire Dist. Elec. Co. v. Cox, 588 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App.
1979); R. CARLSON, supra note 8, at 232; J. WEINSTMN, supra note 21, at 410. See also State v.
Berkeley School Dist., 618 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. 1981).
Another exception has been crafted for medical cases in some jurisdictions where a medical
report is relied upon by a treating doctor as part of the medical history in the case. Such
history information is not received in evidence as independent proof, and when received it is
restricted to factual data. Opinions in third party reports are barred. See supra note 64.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

17

1984]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 5
EXPERT TESTIMONY
V.

CONCLUSION

Several doctrines in the law of evidence accord privileges to crossexaminers which they deny to proponents of a witness. A prime example is Federal Evidence Rule 612 which governs documents used
to refresh the memory of a witness. Initially, only cross-examiners are
allowed to delve into the contents of such documents.
Some judges have not transferred the sound policies of Federal
Evidence Rule 612 to expert witness examinations. Cases have arisen
which allowed disclosure of extrinsic documents at the request of the
direct examiner, simply because the expert referred to the document
as one of the bases for his opinion. Federal Evidence Rule 703 does
not dictate admission of such extrinsic documents. Indeed, prohibition seems mandated by both hearsay principles and constitutional
concerns. The Federal Rules of Evidence and all state counterparts
contain rules against unrestricted admission of hearsay. No special
dispensation from accepted foundation requirements has been
crafted for expert background reports. Only if the out-of-court report
is authenticated as a record of regularly conducted business or professional activities may the record itself become an exhibit in the
case. Absent such authentication, the full content and exact words of
the out-of-court report remain inadmissible hearsay. On direct examination, allusion to the report is restricted to reference to the document as one of the bases for the expert's opinion.
The danger of following any other approach is especially acute in
criminal cases, where confrontation safeguards severely restrict the
introduction of hearsay. Business, professional, and hospital records
are frequently admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Virtually
every formulation, however, requires that the regularity of the entries
contained in the offered record, their timeliness, and the kind of
knowledge possessed by individuals participating in the record-making process be shown by the custodian of the record or other qualified
witness. In short, the typical case requires that testimony must be
provided by a professional, officer, or agent from the institution or
business which generated the record. Such a person knows how the
record is made. Only with this kind of reliable background information will confrontation and hearsay objections be overcome.
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